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CHICKAMAUGA,

THE PRICE OF

CHATTANOOGA.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE

STRATEGIC PLANS, MARCHES, AND BATTLES

OF THE

Campaign of Chattanooga.

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE MAP.

BY

THE AUTHOR OF THE "ANNALS OF THE ARMY OF
THE CUMBERLAND."

PHILADELPHIA:

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.

1864.

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
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
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FOR THE AUTHOR,

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

PREFACE.

THIS pamphlet is issued as an addition to the first editions of the "Annals of the Army of the Cumberland." That work has been so well received that the author is encouraged to add this matter to it in the body of the book hereafter, and as addenda to those already sold: to such parties it is a gift.

The strategic movements constituting the campaign of Chattanooga, so little understood and appreciated hitherto, are here fully portrayed and explained. The reader will readily perceive upon its perusal that that campaign was one of the most wonderful, trying, and important of the war.

The story will well repay perusal: a lesson will be learned in military strategic science, never to be forgotten, and the due tribute will be paid to the fortitude and valor of the soldiery of the Army of the Cumberland.

When the reader has scanned the lesson well, he will admit that this campaign and its attendant battles have given us two hundred miles of front upon rebel territory, and all Tennessee, changing the whole face and character of the war.

The gallant Army of the Cumberland under ROSECRANS shook the tree of secessionism to its uttermost roots: its fruits of victory are now being gathered.

ADDITION TO FOURTH EDITION.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LAST ADVANCE.

THE fourth edition of this volume being required by the public demand, the author makes some material additions, which, he believes, will render the work still more valuable to the Army of the Cumberland and to the friends of Major-General Rosecrans. Since the issuing of our fourth edition, a vast army movement has been undertaken and concluded, and a terrific battle has been fought, resulting in the displacement of the enemy and the occupancy, by the Union forces, of another of the strongholds of the rebellion.

With this there has also been a change of commanders of our army; and hence we deem it especially appropriate to add to this record a brief account of the moving of General Rosecrans's forces across the Tennessee River, the flank movement upon Bragg, the battle of Chickamauga, the successful occupancy of Chattanooga (the grand object for which the battle was fought), and the construction of the defences of that place, with a few remarks on the relieving of the commander of the Army of the Cumberland and on the general situation. This addition, it is hoped, will render the "Annals" still more acceptable, as a complete history of the operations of the Army of the Cumberland under Major-General William S. Rosecrans.

Before proceeding with our narrative of the direct advance of the army upon Chattanooga, it will be well to take a retrospective glance. The advance of the army from Murfreesborough was planned by General Rosecrans with one grand purpose in view,—THE POSSESSION OF CHATTANOOGA. The rebel army was

then intrenched at Tullahoma and Shelbyville, and there a momentary delay was anticipated; but the nook in the bend of the Tennessee River, walled up by grand old mountains upon every hand, was the object aimed at. The accomplishment of this purpose, however, was a matter of extraordinary difficulty. The rebels held the line of railroad, and, if compelled to retreat, would unquestionably destroy it as much as possible to prevent pursuit. The wagon-roads leading in that direction were rude and rough in the extreme, over continuous hill, valley, and mountain, passing through the entire Cumberland range, and preparations must be made at Murfreesborough to move the army through the wilderness, across mountains, and over rivers, by the ordinary modes of land-conveyance. The utmost that could be hoped from the railroad was that if repaired in time it would serve to bring on supplies in the rear of the army. The preparation for such a movement involved the collection of a vast number of horses, mules, wagons, compact army stores, the thorough equipment and clothing of the men, and the thousand minor arrangements always to be made ere marching a great army upon an interior summer campaign. Here was one cause of the long stay of our army at Murfreesborough,—our friends at home becoming in the interim most restive at the delay.

A second reason was, the great lack of cavalry. This defect was fully demonstrated at the battle of Stone River, where the largely superior numbers of the rebel cavalry enabled them to come upon our rear and make the complete circuit of our army, destroying our supply-trains with impunity. General Rosecrans at once set about remedying this want; and the efforts he made to secure animals, by purchase, by inland expeditions of impressment, and even by the wholesale "pressing" of horses at Nashville and vicinity, are described elsewhere in this volume. By such tedious means the four regiments constituting Wilder's brigade of infantry were mounted. While this supply of horses were being procured, a goodly share of them, purchased for our army at Louisville, were necessarily taken at that city to mount General Burnside's forces in their expedition to the

Cumberland Gap, and also to go in pursuit of the rebel General John Morgan, who was then passing through Kentucky and Indiana on his last and most notable raid. The want of cavalry was finally remedied, to a limited extent, after much procrastination and difficulty, that arm of the service being brought up to about six thousand effectively mounted men,—a force which was deemed sufficient to protect the immense trains of the army and to do scouting and pioneer service upon the march South.

Another, and a very potent, reason, weighed in the minds of the general and corps commanders of our army. The siege of Vicksburg was progressing, and to advance was not deemed politic,—since if Bragg were driven from the valley of the Tennessee, the probability was that he would retire to Chattanooga, and, leaving a small force there behind intrenchments, would send the bulk of his army to operate with Johnston against the forces of General Grant. This view was taken by all the officers of the army, and was at length adopted by the people of the country. The result proved—many idle reports at that time to the contrary—that Bragg's army lay quiet at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, and thereabout, intact; only Breekinridge, and a small portion of the uneasy element of the rebel army, leaving it in that direction. The defensive works at both of these places were of the most formidable character. The rebels had been industrious, and, aided by the labor of some three thousand slaves sent up mainly from Georgia and Alabama, intrenchments were thrown up, earth forts, &c., quite surpassing the famed rebel works at Corinth, Miss., which for several weeks held at bay a Union army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. At Shelbyville these rebel works extended over a circuit of five miles.

It must also be remembered that the co-operation of the forces of General Burnside was expected in the advance movement, he penetrating into East Tennessee,—which was eventually and successfully done. But further delay inevitably arose from this source, although commendable despatch was exhibited on the part of that auxiliary command.

At length, when the above-mentioned preparations had been made, and when General Rosecrans was fully satisfied that the investment of Vicksburg was complete and must result successfully, he ordered the advance from Murfreesborough, as stated in a preceding page, on the 24th of June. Even then the means for a forward movement were not such as could have been desired, and many doubts troubled the minds of the old campaigners of the army, the most of whom had participated in the advance to the Tennessee River, under Buell, the year before. They well knew the rugged character of the country, and the long and unprotected rear line through a destitute and hostile region. It is a fact worthy of mention, that the corps and division generals of our army were by no means enthusiastic as to the position on their front. When requested by General Rosecrans to advise with him upon this matter of an immediate advance, the unanimous opinion, in writing, of those seventeen generals, was that an advance at that time was inexpedient. General Rosecrans, however, deemed it best to advance, and the army was soon put in motion. Some time before this, the War Department had issued to the commander-in-chief strenuous appeals and orders to advance. General Rosecrans asked in return if such orders were peremptory, stating that if so, he would tender his resignation rather than encounter the fearful consequences. The orders were decided to be merely advisory; and the general assured the War Department that preparation was going on in all possible haste, and that the fall of Vicksburg he hoped was nearly a certainty.

The author advances the opinion, for which he is alone responsible, that short and ill-tempered orders from the War Department, over the telegraphic wires, upon this matter, developed a feeling of contentious opposition, if not of unjust action, on the part of the Secretary of War and his advisers at Washington, continually manifest since that time, and which has recently cropped out in a remarkable manner. That Rosecrans and Thomas, and the entire corps of generals of the army, were correct in their views, has been conclusively proven by results.

The cavalry, that hitherto lame-leg of the army, was now able to cope with the rebel horsemen, especially since the loss to the latter of John Morgan's command. Teams and supplies were selected and compacted which carried our army over two hundred miles of difficult land-travel, and enabled it to wage a two days' battle, and to successfully enter and retain Chattanooga. Bragg's army was prevented from marching to the relief of Vicksburg,—although the country was assured by divers alarming reports that it had been divided, and even decimated, for that purpose, leaving a mere shell of *Quaker* camp-equipage and cannon to oppose to the Army of the Cumberland. That bubble was speedily pricked. Let it be borne in mind that the generals who thus confronted the mandates of the War Department are now in command of the Army of the Cumberland, and most deservedly enjoy the confidence of the army and of the nation.

The advance of our army upon Tullahoma by flank movement,—the rushing into mountain-gaps, driving back, by gallant charges and sharp hand-to-hand encounters, the rebel forces stationed there,—the astonishment of Bragg at finding our forces marching past him and threatening his rear and railroad,—his sudden flight, abandoning all his works, forts, and vaunted military resources of surrounding produce and forage,—his hasty retreat to the Tennessee River, followed so closely by our forces that he must needs fight the while, and had no time to injure the railroad, further than to destroy nearly every bridge upon it,—the swoop of our gallant troops across the Cumberland Mountains in pursuit, treading upon the enemy so closely that he failed in completely destroying the great bridge over the Tennessee, several of the extensive spans midway being saved,—all this is history, and is in great part narrated in the preceding pages. The series of marches from Murfreesborough to the Tennessee River, and the attending brilliant successes, have no parallel in the history of this war. An army of at least forty thousand men were forced from their fortified works by flank approaches, through mountain-passes

which the rebels deemed they had sufficiently guarded, after most vigorous and galling charges! But this great victory, achieved by strategy, rapidly and gallantly executed, excited little comment,—and very naturally. Vicksburg had recently fallen, and the nation was aglow. The smaller success was enveloped by, or rather was incorporated into, the greater. Had the Army of the Cumberland stormed the ramparts of Tullahoma, spiked its seventy pieces of cannon, and driven back its rebel defenders at the cost of ten thousand men, the victory would have been chronicled in story and in song. But to win victory at the least cost has ever been the study of General Rosecrans.

Although successful in this movement upon the enemy at Tullahoma, a keen sense of disappointment was experienced in this regard. Our generals had planned the movement with a view not only to drive out Bragg, but to reach his rear, and forcing him to a battle at a serious disadvantage, to overwhelm him and destroy his army. The weather had been most favorable, and the country roads were in good order. It was mid-summer, when continued rains are unusual. But upon the morning of the advance the rain commenced, and continued as if the very windows of heaven had been opened. For seventeen consecutive days the rain fell in remarkable quantity. No such stormy period had visited that country for twenty-six years past. The army moved on through the storm; but the roads were soon cut up, and the rear squadrons and columns, with the supply and ammunition trains, were for several days completely “stalled” in the mud. This of course delayed our advance, and permitted Bragg to retreat upon his railroad with all his material.

CROSSING THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

THERE was some delay in the advance of the army as it approached the foot of the Cumberland Mountains. This was

caused by the period of incessant rain, the mud of the country roads impeding army locomotion, and the teams becoming exhausted and requiring rest. Meantime, vigorous railroad repairs were being effected; bridges were erected, the railroad-tunnel below Cowan was cleared out, and, by the time the army had reached the river, the shrill shriek of the locomotive again pierced the valleys, and the roar of hundreds of bread-and-forage-laden cars echoed back from the mountains of Northern Alabama.

The crossing of the Tennessee River by our army was a remarkable feat. After the completion of the means of crossing, four days were consumed in the passage of the army at the various places. The constant measured tread of infantry; the tramp of thousands of cavalry; the rattle and shout, and the crack of the whip, as those four thousand heavily-laden wagons, in trains miles in length, bounced from the banks on to the narrow pontoon causeways; the heavier jar and crash, as the huge artillery vehicles rumbled over the planks,—all must be heard to be duly appreciated. The quick passage of our army over that wide, swift-running river, without the loss of a single man or animal, is a feature in army experience worthy of note. To effect this crossing of the larger part of the army, General Rosecrans ordered one pontoon bridge to be laid down at Caperton's Ferry, three miles from Stevenson, twelve hundred and fifty feet in length, and another pontoon bridge at Bridgeport, twelve miles up the river, of twenty-seven hundred feet. Not having pontoons enough to complete the latter, his engineers finished out the bridge by setting down trestles and planking them over.

CHATTANOOGA TAKEN BY STRATEGY.

WE should state here that, previous to this time, General Crittenden's corps had crossed to the Sequatchie Valley, midway towards Chattanooga, to operate against Bragg on his front, from the north and opposite side of the river, while the com-

mands of Generals McCook and Thomas were crossing the river below. The Union commander had resolved upon capturing Chattanooga by strategic movements. In fact, he could not hope to enter it by a direct forward movement from the north. Bragg was there, in the nook; his front a broad river, over two thousand feet wide, whose banks on his side were lined with cannon, ready to sweep off men from pontoon bridges as fast as they stepped upon them, or to destroy boats, rafts, or bridges entire. Therefore a plan was adopted to this effect: Crittenden's corps was to go up on the north side of the river as far as Chattanooga, and there feign the intention of crossing and making the attack in front,—*à la* Fredericksburg, Va. His men made a toilsome march across and among the Cumberlands, dragging their cannon over precipices by hand, and accomplishing their task in about four days' time. Thus temporarily located in the Sequatchie Valley, he despatched four brigades—two of cavalry, Colonel Minty's and Wilder's mounted infantry, and Generals Hazen's and Waggoner's brigades of infantry—to proceed to points on the river opposite Chattanooga and immediately above and below that town, and make the feigned attack. This was done. Some of Wilder's troops above the town let ends of logs and rails and bits of lumber float down past Bragg's front, as if they were preparing a bridge; other troops slapped boards together, to make a lumbering noise; while Wilder unlimbered his artillery and shelled the town. Some of his balls raised a dusty sensation over the way, one of them, it was said, having struck a church during the services of a Sabbath morning.

While Bragg's attention was thus being occupied, the two pontoon bridges below were thrown over and fords were worked, as already stated, and the main army of the Cumberland, under Generals Thomas and McCook, crossed the river. Our cavalry, meanwhile, went mostly by another and more western route, by way of Athens, passing through the town of Huntsville,—thus going around (flanking, in military parlance) the most abrupt of the Cumberland Mountains. The plan devised for gaining Chattanooga we will now more fully elucidate. While Crittenden

den was thus to threaten with his four brigades on the opposite side, below and in front of that place, to mislead Bragg, the main body of the army was to march down into Georgia to two gaps piercing Lookout Mountain, and, passing through them, to come in on Bragg's rear. Lookout Mountain is a high range, or spur, running back from the river, just below Chattanooga, into the heart of Georgia,—a "hog-back" ridge, so to speak, terminating at the river in a steep bluff. It is of great height, and its descent upon either side very abrupt and rugged. The railroad creeps along upon a shelf cut into the solid rock under this knob, near the water's edge, where the mountain appears to have been separated from its kindred links across the river by the floods of the Tennessee, which for countless ages have rolled down upon and past this barrier in resistless might. The river west of Chattanooga, in its general direction, runs southwest. Skirting it is the Raccoon range, of which the Sand Mountain, where the army passed over, is part. After marching over a plateau twelve or fifteen miles in width, the Sand Mountain is descended, and the Lookout Valley is gained, some two miles wide, running southwest, and bounded on the east by the Lookout Mountains, running parallel with the Raccoon range.

With this explanation (which we will soon demonstrate to the reader by tracing the campaign with him upon our map), we proceed with our account of the movement. Lookout Valley, coursing down along the west side of Lookout Mountain, ends against an angle, or another spur of that mountain, and this place is called Valley Head. Here there is a break in the direct line, where the rugged mountain melts away into a wild scattering of considerable hills, near which the road is abruptly turned through winding valleys,—not forgetting, however, a jagged and stubborn spur which rears its head at this point. This, like some other mountain-ranges in North Georgia, is quite wide on its top, and, in many places, susceptible of cultivation: so that the traveller will occasionally meet with a small patch of a farm, with usually wretched improvements. Says one of the corre-

spondents of the Cincinnati "Commercial," writing of the pass at Valley Head:—

"After reaching the top, another plateau, some dozen miles wide, is encountered, so level and gently rolling, that one laughs at his preconceived ideas of the tops of mountains,—if, indeed, he does not forget that he has left a valley. No peaks from which to unfurl a flag, if any one should be geographically poetic; no sugar-loaves where one can clamber, and feel like a giddy explorer standing on a heavenward land's-end. There are groves and fields, and smooth-flowing streams, where the imagination pictures verdant crags and cascades."

Thus General McCook's corps safely and speedily climbed the abrupt Raccoon Mountain, which faces Bridgeport and Stevenson, and thence directed their course across, over Sand Mountain, through Valley Head, over Lookout Mountain, at Winston's Gap, until they reached the next valley, called Broomtown Valley, directly threatening the rebel rear. This was a memorable march, over a distance of forty-nine miles. From this newly acquired point General McCook sent a reconnoitring force to Alpine, three miles farther south, to threaten Bragg's rear. Still farther down, our own mounted forces were upon the move to mystify the rebel general, a detachment of Colonel Brownlow's Tennessee cavalry going within five miles of Rome.

Leaving McCook thus located in Bragg's rear, we will explain the movement of the corps under General Thomas. He marched south from Bridgeport, over spurs of mountains and through deep wooded gulches, to the Lookout Valley, followed that narrow and meandering channel to another depression, crossed through at Cooper's and Stevens's Gaps, after toilsome marches over the roughest of mountain roads, and took position at the mouths of those gaps, in Bragg's rear. This division thus marched fifty-one miles from Bridgeport, and was now twenty-six miles south of Chattanooga by the nearest practicable wagon-road. McCook's division was seventeen miles farther south, being a total of forty-three miles below Chattanooga, and his outpost at Alpine, over sixty miles.

The rebel commander now became fully aware of Rosecrans's intention, but too late, if he had even had the force, to prevent its execution. By taking possession of the gaps on his side of Lookout Mountain, he might have fortified them and prevented the passage of our troops. This had not been done; and the Federals were now in his rear many miles below, threatening his railroad and subsistence, and preventing the arrival of reinforcements. On the 8th of September, General Thomas had full occupancy of those gaps, and on the 9th of that month, General Bragg's army evacuated Chattanooga, going south, mainly by the Rome road. In passing down the valley, in front of Thomas, Bragg endeavored to cut off some advanced regiments; but Thomas cautiously drew them up to him, within the jaws of the gaps, and the rebel hosts marched southward rapidly, but in regular order.

Meanwhile General Crittenden was moving. He proceeded to cross the main body of his troops over the Tennessee River at and above Bridgeport, following Thomas, and then took up his line of march for Chattanooga over the very brow of Lookout Mountain. Arriving upon the mountain, he found that Bragg had fled, leaving the town quite deserted. He entered the place at once, and was soon after joined by his four brigades from the opposite side of the river. This accomplished, General Crittenden moved his corps out to Ringgold, on the railroad, to reconnoitre the enemy. His advance speedily ascertained that Bragg had fallen back only to Lafayette, and had taken position. He at once moved with all possible haste across to Lookout Mountain, to be within reach of Thomas, for it was now apparent that the enemy were becoming more bold and belligerent. The reader will find no difficulty in understanding that the sole aim of all this strategy and hard marching was *to force Bragg out of Chattanooga and to get in there ourselves*. Not a plan was laid, hardly a thought was indulged in, which did not refer to that purpose. Chattanooga was the OBJECT of that campaign.

We had taken that place,—or, rather, our smallest corps of

troops had passed into and through it. But our army was mainly down among the mountain-ranges of Georgia, and *its* occupancy of Chattanooga was yet to be. General Rosecrans and staff had also marched into Chattanooga, and he there fixed his general head-quarters. As for himself, however, and his other officers, with the exception of clerks and office-men, his head-quarters were in the field, miles below, solely intent upon consolidating and bringing his columns north. There were newspaper reporters also in Chattanooga upon the entry of Crittenden, and they represented to the world that the town was gained and securely held, and that the great Army of the Cumberland were now marching in pursuit of Bragg, and might possibly pursue him even to Dalton and to Atlanta. And there were shouts of a joyful people at the North at this great success, as announced in the daily newspapers. But this news and this joy were premature. Not so felt the several Union commanders. Rosecrans, and Thomas, and Palmer, and their *confrères*, were then aware of what was soon fully developed,—*the reinforcement of Bragg*, and his turning upon our army.

The strategic movements of Rosecrans at once alarmed the Southern Confederacy. He was moving on them; but how, was the mystery. But they rallied their troops from every section. A large portion of Stonewall Jackson's division of Virginia veterans were sent down from Lee's army, with Longstreet, Lee's best general, in command. Brigades were hurried up from Charleston and Mobile. Buckner's army of ten thousand came down from East Tennessee, and a large force was received from Johnston's Mississippi army, which had failed in succoring Pemberton at Vicksburg. It is ascertained, also, that a considerable number of rebel troops captured and paroled at Vicksburg had joined Bragg's army, as well as some eight thousand of Georgia State militia hastily collected for the emergency. Thus Bragg's army was swelled, *in one week's time*, from about forty thousand to upwards of eighty thousand men. We shall prove this conclusively farther on. Bragg marched to a short distance below, and, at a point opposite the gaps where our forces

lay, halted and took position. Here he met his first heavy reinforcements; and others began to pour in. He left Chattanooga on the 9th of September; on the 16th of the same month he addressed a notice to his army, to the effect that, having been heavily reinforced, they were now to assume the offensive and drive the invaders from the soil of Georgia.

Of this Rosecrans was early made aware, and to concentrate his army and get to Chattanooga, or, at least, to be able to select his position and prepare for the grand battle that was threatening, was his great object. McCook was ordered to come to Thomas, and Crittenden to remain within close supporting distance of the latter general. We have stated that the gap where McCook's corps had crossed, and in which it now lay, was seventeen miles below the force of General Thomas. McCook was instructed to use all possible haste, and, fully advised of Bragg's strength and preparations for attack, he moved with great celerity. He was informed of a road on the mountain-top that would lead him north in an almost direct course to the upper gaps; but, relying upon the assertion of scouts and refugees that no such practicable route existed, he retraced his march through the gap, across the mountain, to Valley Head, thence up Lookout Valley, to the gaps where Thomas had passed, and marched over the same route, joining Thomas at the mouth of the gaps,—whereupon Thomas moved away from the gap a short distance, towards Chattanooga and Crittenden. Thus McCook marched four days and a half over a distance of forty-six miles, when he could have come by the cross-road on the mountain, seventeen miles, in a day and a half. He acted, however, on what he supposed to be his best information, and the error was a very natural one. His corps made extraordinary marches during those memorable four and a half days, and he and his gallant men are entitled to the thanks of the nation.

But in this delay there was fearful danger and loss of advantage. The rebel hosts were marshalling and advancing upon our army. Had they moved only a day or two sooner, and driven Thomas back within his gaps, holding him there with a portion

of their forces while they advanced upon Crittenden with their main army and forced him back to Chattanooga, and into the river, or among the mountains, how completely foiled would have been the Union army! The campaign would have been lost, and we would have been left with our forces divided far down among the inhospitable mountains. These few days were days of deep anxiety to the general commanding and to his staff and advisers! But Bragg, it was subsequently ascertained, was not ready to attack: his forces were not well in hand, and when he moved upon us it was too late to prevent the concentration. The delay occasioned by the roundabout march of McCook's corps was mainly unfortunate in this: it prevented the Union commander from choosing his battle-field.

How imperfectly was all this strategy understood, except by the generals in command and their confidants! The soldiers and the reporters were equally in the dark as to the object of the movements. The retreat of McCook through the mountains, to join Thomas, was described by a writer to a prominent paper in the Northwest, after the battle and so-called "failure," or "defeat," as a hasty and mistaken march farther south, to try to get in Bragg's rear and cut off his retreat; and the editor of this Northwestern paper was fain to believe, with due sorrow and mortification, that Rosecrans had been completely outwitted, and thereby badly defeated. Other army correspondents sent to the world joyful accounts of the utter demoralization of Bragg's army, of his weakness and retreat, as they followed down with Crittenden's corps in his march to the support of Thomas! In their mistaken zeal, they already pictured Rosecrans at Dalton and Atlanta. They could not perceive the gathering of the rebel clans among those mountain-valleys not more than ten miles beyond. Had our commander-in-chief called into his tent these gentlemen of the press, and explained his plans and revealed the tidings brought him by his spies and scouts, they would not have fallen into such errors and have so grossly misled the public. But such revelations cannot be made. Better that the newsmen err than that Bragg be

informed, through the Louisville, Cincinnati, and New York papers, of the scheme that has been so carefully and skilfully elaborated, by which he is walked out of his fortified places and great natural defences without the firing of a gun. To hide his forces here and there among the valleys,—to move in such a way as to baffle the intelligence of the enemy,—to have the main army forty miles in the enemy's rear, when he fancies it on his front and just below him,—such was the strategy of General Rosecrans; and to publish it before its accomplishment, would be far more disadvantageous than to permit the people of the Union to be so grossly deceived by the eager and well-intentioned news-gatherers of the public press.

CHICKAMAUGA.

WE have shown that Bragg evacuated Chattanooga on the 9th of September. He marched down past the valley of Chickamauga Creek, some thirty miles, to Lafayette. McCook's corps was at once set in motion to rejoin Thomas, which feat was accomplished on the 18th. Bragg began to march back on the 17th, to attack our corps in detail, before their junction was effected. In this he failed: McCook had come in from the south, and Crittenden from the north, in support. The reader will remember that Bragg attributes this failure to two of his subordinate generals, Polk and Hindman, and after the battle relieved them from their commands. Bragg now strikes for the main Rome road, leading into Chattanooga, hoping thus to get between our army and the river. General Rosecrans foresees this, and orders an advance in force to secure this road. General Thomas breaks camp at sunset, Friday, the 18th, and makes his memorable night march, over hill and through forest and valley, and by sunrise next morning reaches it and takes position. Within two hours thereafter, the rebel advance reaches this road, a short distance below

our forces, and remains quiet. General Thomas sent out a strong reconnoitring force to feel the enemy, about ten o'clock on Saturday morning, the 19th. They found the rebels in force and advancing, and brisk skirmishing soon merged into severe fighting. The rebels were apparently surprised to find the road occupied in their advance, and gave battle with their accustomed impetuosity, following back our reconnoitring column to the Union lines, when the battle became general along the entire front. Thomas, by his night march, filing to the left past Crittenden, became the left wing, leaving the latter the centre, and McCook, retaining his first position, on the right.

We shall not attempt to give the movements of the two days' battle in detail: the official report of the commander-in-chief describes them fully and correctly. Our present aim is merely to give a general outline of the battle, in connection with the strategic plans of the campaign of Chattanooga.

The battle of Saturday resulted in our general success. The contest raged along hillsides and amid forests and ravines. The army lines extended over nearly three miles of ground; and only by the smoke that rose above the heights, and the dust that ascended above the forest-trees in the valley, or as the cannon's roar and the rattling discharges of musketry were heard upon surrounding hills, could the observer note the ebb and flow of the tide of battle.

When the rebels advanced upon Thomas in heavy line of battle, he informed General Rosecrans of the fact; and the latter, who was at the right, personally inspecting the lines, arranging batteries, &c., instructed Thomas to hold his position on the main road by all possible means, and that, if necessary, he should be amply reinforced. The battle raged all day, darkness alone ending the conflict. The fighting was constant, and occasionally furious. Brigade after brigade of the Union forces was moved into the conflict, until every brigade in the army had participated. At one period two of our divisions were badly driven by immensely superior rebel forces; but the lost ground was soon after fully recovered. No signal advantage had enured

to either side when the day's conflict closed, each having taken prisoners. But this day of battle had fully demonstrated the fact that the Army of the Cumberland was contending against fearfully superior numbers of determined and exasperated veterans. It was reported that some of the rebel Virginia soldiers cried out, as they charged upon the walled lines of Thomas, "You are not fighting with conscripts now!" to which the answer would be shouted back by the Western boys, "You are not fighting with Eastern store-clerks!" On the evening of this day there was a consultation of commanders at General Rosecrans's head-quarters, at the "Widow Glen" house, where it had been during the day, within musket-range of the line of battle. Each reported that every brigade had been in the day's fight, and that our troops had acted finely; but all agreed that in every severe attack made upon us we had been invariably outnumbered. It was plain that the next day's contest must be for the preservation of the army and the holding of Chattanooga.

After due consultation with his corps commanders, the following plan for the second day's battle was decided upon, and was announced at one o'clock that morning. General Thomas, with Johnson's division from McCook's corps, and Palmer's division from Crittenden's corps, was to maintain his present position. McCook was to post the remainder of his corps on the right of Thomas; while Crittenden was to place the remainder of his corps in reserve, near the point of junction of the other two corps, and to support either, as circumstances might require. These positions were assumed by daylight. It soon becoming apparent that the enemy would wage strongest battle on Thomas's left, with a design to turn him and reach the main road, Negley's division was ordered from McCook's line to take position at the left of Thomas, and McCook was instructed to close up the gap thus made in his line.

The rebels commenced the battle early; and it raged with tremendous fierceness, at times, along the entire lines. General Thomas reported that the pressure upon him was most severe; and he was instructed, in return, to hold his point without fail,

with the assurance that, if necessary, he should be reinforced by the entire army. The rebels invariably attacked, and were as invariably repulsed, their object appearing to be to find some point where our lines might be penetrated. It was in consequence of this manner of fighting, the rebels moving while the Federals were in position, the latter often lying down and thus loading their muskets, only rising to fire and to repel a charge, that the rebel killed and wounded greatly exceeded our own. A multitude of important orders were given during this time, and many movements were made, their results conforming to this general outline. All went favorably, the enemy being held firmly in check and undergoing terrible slaughter, until about one o'clock in the afternoon, when, by the misconception of an order, one of our divisions was moved in the wrong direction, and a gap was left open in our battle-front at the point of junction between Thomas and McCook. This the enemy quickly perceived. They advanced rapidly and heavily, and poured their columns in at the gap, taking both McCook and Thomas on the flank, crushing Crittenden, and completely changing the order of the battle at that point. General Davis's gallant old division charged in to stay the rushing tide, but in vain. General Rosecrans was speedily present, and ordered forward Sheridan with two light brigades; but they were also swept back before the rush of the now exultant foe. In fact, the right wing of the army was partially cut off, and Crittenden's reserve was forced back in confusion. Thus it was that seven brigades were isolated from Thomas and the main body of the army. Sheridan retreated in tolerable order, and by a quick movement eventually succeeded in getting to the support of Thomas. On both sides of this gap the fighting was irregular and against us, we there losing most of the prisoners and guns taken by the enemy. The rebels now charged down the valley, and among hills and forests, surrounding, crushing, and capturing, until they were recalled by their leaders to assist in the necessary driving of Thomas from the main road.

General Thomas was still in strong position with his corps,

reinforced by Palmer's, Wood's, and Johnson's divisions, and one brigade of Van Cleve's division. The rebels now bent all their energies to the dislodging of our main army. They attacked, and were repulsed, again and again. Our troops fought well: they were nobly led. Thomas, Palmer, Johnson, and other Union generals, won imperishable honor by their coolness and bravery. From two o'clock until sunset the battle thus raged in front of our lines. The rebels, in despair, hurled their entire army upon the devoted Union forces, who were now outnumbered by more than two to one and were greatly exhausted. General Granger's command, however, of three fresh brigades, arrived, soon after the breaking of our line of battle, from towards Rossville, and at this critical juncture they bore the brunt of the shock. General Stedman, the Ohio fighter, marched to a gap which was being attacked by Longstreet's men, with two of the fresh brigades, and for forty minutes the most furious contest of the battle took place. He repulsed the advancing horde three times, with frightful slaughter, himself losing nearly one thousand men from his command. The rebels now gave up the contest and withdrew.

Thus ended the battles of Chickamauga. The enemy were too severely cut up to again offer battle. Their desperate charges were led by their officers in person: hence their loss in generals, twelve of whom were said to be discomfited,—four of them being killed, four mortally and four slightly wounded. Their loss in colonels and subordinate officers was proportionately severe. The cannon of Thomas, at times, mowed down their advancing troops as the grass falls before the reaper. During the night of this last day of battle, General Thomas, not knowing what the enemy might attempt the next day, fell back three miles, unmolested, and took up a much stronger position near Rossville. Here the Union forces formed in line of battle, and remained during the next day,—Monday; and, the enemy not appearing, on that evening the army took up the march for Chattanooga, a distance of five miles, and entered it in order, with all their material.

General Rosecrans, when our line was pierced, and after vainly attempting to stem the rebel tide with the troops at hand of Davies's and Sheridan's divisions, started with his attendants to reach General Thomas. The enemy being between them and that officer, and the country being of the roughest character imaginable, without roads or even horse-paths, the party also being strangers to the locality, they determined to debouch to the rear and gain the main road at Rossville, a distance of four miles, and then repair to the main army. At or near Rossville was a reserve force under General Granger; and the intention of General Rosecrans was to order this reserve forward to the support of Thomas forthwith.

Arriving at Rossville, it was ascertained that Thomas was holding his own, with prospects of keeping the enemy at bay until night; also, that Granger's reserve had already started to his support. Thus, all was as yet well in that quarter. But General Rosecrans's attention was now drawn to Chattanooga. The wildest confusion reigned there and along the roads. The seven brigades of McCook and Crittenden, numbering perhaps ten thousand men, were much demoralized. In general terms, and to give a clear understanding of the matter to the reader, without pretending to accuracy in figures, we will say that perhaps one-half of these broken troops were halted, reformed, and gradually moved back to the rear of Thomas during the afternoon, while the remainder, numbering perhaps five thousand men, together with teamsters and the usual array of camp-followers and attendants, were directing their way through the forests and by every footpath towards Chattanooga.

General Rosecrans was as yet uncertain of the general result. It was now about three o'clock in the afternoon, and appearances were much against him on his right. He consulted with his attendants, and soon decided—as would any prudent commander whose army was in fearful jeopardy—to aim at two points: first, to hold the enemy at bay, if possible, until night, and then to retreat into Chattanooga; secondly, to have that place put in due state of defence. Having thus determined, and deeming it

most important that he should look after his rear, he despatched his chief of staff, General Garfield, to the front, to convey intelligence and orders to General Thomas. General Rosecrans proceeded to the town, arriving there about four o'clock in the afternoon, and set about preparations for defence. The thousands of teams that filled the main streets in rows four and five deep, were ordered across the river. The stragglers were put to work, and many of them were reformed and sent back to the army. Breast-works were planned and commenced in the rear of the place, ready for a new and last line of battle, should such a struggle come. Our troops had been out twenty-one days, and their supply of rations and ammunition was nearly exhausted. The long lines of our supply trains were near Chattanooga, in the valley, ten miles distant from the main battle-field; and General Rosecrans well knew that, were those trains cut off and destroyed by the rebel advance, our forces would be starved out of Chattanooga as well as fought out of it. The safety of those trains, and the security of the several fords and of his pontoon-bridges, were not forgotten by our general in that hour of critical danger. Although Thomas was holding the greatly superior enemy in check, the latter might succeed in a flank movement, causing our forces to fall back to the town, perhaps in haste and disorder. The commander-in-chief had been constantly upon the battle-fields. He was most fearful of the failure of our right, weakened as it had been by reinforcements sent elsewhere. Throughout he was busy in receiving reports, despatching orders, posting troops, and personally overseeing the placing of batteries. Cool, clear, and calm as an autumn day, and, though most anxious, yet hopeful, his manner, as upon the open fields at Stone River, was cheering, and his words encouraging. But the country was so broken that his two miles of army lines were in a great measure hidden from his view. He was not able to judge of events upon the instant, nor was the ground susceptible of such action on his part as was exhibited upon the cotton-fields of Murfreesborough. The reader will remember that the line of the Chickamauga was an

accidental battle-field to both contending armies. It afforded few opportunities for the ordinary field display of generalship. In such a contest, success lay mainly with the bravest and the greater numbers, accident, etc.

General Garfield, chief of staff, proceeded to General Thomas and explained the condition of affairs, informing him that, if he deemed it advisable, he could retire the army to Rossville after night and there take a stronger position, or that, if necessary, he could come in to Chattanooga. This was Sunday night; and the town was, as above stated, filled with "demoralized" soldiers, teamsters, sutlers, and camp-followers, including, perhaps, we ought to add, sundry newspaper reporters. Each person had his own version of the scenes of the battles and of our "awful defeat." Those who flee invariably magnify the cause of their flight. While the main bulk of the glorious Army of the Cumberland was in good order, and successfully repelling the attacks of the enemy, our "Bohemian" corps—as represented by at least two or three of its prominent members—were busily engaged in shedding their befogged ideas upon paper, assuring the country that our army had been fighting the entire Southern Confederacy and had been terribly defeated.

To show conclusively that the battle of Chickamauga was a necessity, that it was forced upon our army, let us advert to the dates of the various movements. General Thomas accomplished his march through Lookout Mountain in Bragg's rear on the 12th of September. General McCook passed through Winston's Gap, and took position on the 10th. General Bragg evacuated Chattanooga on the 8th and 9th, and passed southward, in front of Thomas, on the 12th. McCook was ordered to retire and join Thomas on the 12th, which task he mainly accomplished by the 18th. Crittenden moved to the support of Thomas on the 18th. Bragg issued his order to his troops, assuring them of reinforcements and their ability to drive "the invaders," &c. on the 16th, and he commenced his advance movement upon our army and Chattanooga on the 17th. On the 18th his pickets and cavalry had constant skirmishing with our forces, and on the

19th and 20th were fought the great battles. It will thus be perceived that General Rosecrans lost no time in marching upon Chattanooga and in concentrating his army, when the rebels assumed the offensive.

We should here state—in justice to our subject and to individuals—that so apparently necessary and expedient was this action upon the part of General Rosecrans, that not until soon after his removal, which took place some four weeks after the battle, was a breath of reproach heard respecting it. One circumstance, probably, tended to call attention to the fact that he left the battle-field before the close of the conflict,—viz.: the entry of Major-Generals McCook and Crittenden into Chattanooga without their commands. It is due to those gallant officers, than whom we know none more brave and determined upon the field of battle, and to the officers upon their staffs, and to the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland who were under their command, that the following facts should be made known.

We have stated that the commands of McCook and Crittenden were depleted, to reinforce Thomas, at the main point of the battle. We have shown that their line of battle was pierced by the enemy at the point where their forces joined on to Thomas, partly through an error in the movement of a division, which caused a gap in the lines, and partly on account of the overwhelming numbers of the rebel army, which then centred at that point, after having been repeatedly foiled in their attacks elsewhere. The reader has seen that Davis and Sheridan gallantly plunged into the breach with their divisions, and were quickly thrust aside by the advancing tide. The crumbling in pieces of those seven brigades amidst those forest-clad hills and valleys, in midsummer, where the foliage and unevenness of the locality precluded to a great extent any comprehensive view of the situation, has been duly commented upon. Generals McCook and Crittenden labored with all possible zeal and ardor to repair the disaster of the hour. They rode hither and thither, in various directions, endeavoring to collect their scattered forces. They found their men wherever they rode, completely disorganized, some-

times in squads and groups, but more often singly and by twos and threes, all urging their way back through the thickets towards Chattanooga. To reform the men, under such circumstances, was a sheer impossibility. That they attempted it, and made all possible exertions to retrieve the fortunes of the day, will, we are assured, be fully established by their official reports. Under the circumstances,—it being then after three o'clock in the afternoon,—they deemed it advisable to repair to Chattanooga. We speak of them in connection for the sake of brevity only. They came in separately, neither knowing of the whereabouts of the other. Not until they reached the town could they ascertain the situation of affairs with General Thomas. They reported to General Rosecrans; and he bade them wait until intelligence came in from General Garfield. Upon its arrival, with the assurance that our army held its position firmly, they returned to the front, and assisted in the falling back, during the night, to the new line of defence near Ross-ville, and, finally, came into Chattanooga with the army.

No complaint was uttered against these two officers by General Rosecrans. The Secretary of War, however, found reason for ordering their immediate suspension from their positions, and commanded them to appear at Indianapolis, Indiana, there to undergo trial as military felons. We have fully and candidly stated the facts: from them let the people of our land render judgment. The army was surprised and shocked at this sudden action, attended as it was by the instant consolidation of the 20th and 21st Army Corps. It was considered an imputation on the bravery of hundreds of officers and thousands of men in the Army of the Cumberland, too monstrous to be entertained.

MAP OF THE STRATEGIC MOVEMENT.

To afford valuable instruction is one of the main objects of this volume. We have fully portrayed with our pen the march

of the Army of the Cumberland upon Chattanooga. Still further to aid the reader, we have prepared a map with much care, upon which the entire movement can be traced. Let the reader turn to it, and accompany us in its examination.

Our army is starting from Murfreesborough. The several blue lines indicate the marching of the several commands. General McCook's corps take to the right, and Thomas and Crittenden to the left; and thus they flank Bragg at Tullahoma, and he retreats. Our army soon pushes on, reaching Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Jasper. The Tennessee River is now crossed by McCook and Thomas, and their lines of march are readily traced down among the valleys and ridges and through Lookout Mountain to the rear of Bragg. The rebels evacuate; and Crittenden, who has meanwhile crossed the Tennessee and marched up towards Chattanooga, now enters that town, and then sets out for Ringgold. It will be perceived that Bragg is now heavily reinforced, and turns upon Thomas and McCook. The march of the latter back to form a junction with the former is shown by the dotted blue lines. Bragg now marches for the main road to Chattanooga, and to get in front of our army, as is seen by the course of the red lines. Thomas also makes for the same road; and the battle ensues.

The reader will be amply repaid, in the study of these army movements, by the acquisition of knowledge respecting military strategy accomplished upon American soil and attended by one of the greatest battles of modern times.

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

THE occupation of Chattanooga was accomplished. For seven months past, since the taking of Murfreesborough, this had been the task for our army to perform. The entire object has been gained; and we are quite unable to perceive wherein lies "the defeat," "the disaster to Rosecrans," &c. &c., that the patriotic

people of the North and West have been solicited to believe. That such a wrong impression respecting a great battle could arise, appears almost incredible: yet, under the peculiar circumstances, it may be explained. The partial occupancy of Chattanooga by Crittenden's corps would lead the world to believe that the Army of the Cumberland was there. The regretful thought would then arise, our army having got so snugly into Chattanooga, why race down among the mountains fifty miles to get up a fight with rebels, reinforced as they unquestionably would be? Some reporters stated that McCook and Thomas were going on to Dalton, and Atlanta, and Savannah, and Charleston, leaving Bragg penned up in Chattanooga with our army at his door! When once understood, as we here endeavor to explain it, the American people will appreciate the fact that the strategic campaign of Rosecrans on Chattanooga was one of the most extensive, the grandest, and the most successful of the war.

To show how completely deceived were very many able men as to our having gained Chattanooga, we copy the following editorial from the New York "Tribune" of September last, which assumes that the Army of the Cumberland was then in that place safe and snug:—

"CHATTANOOGA.—The occupation of Chattanooga by General Rosecrans is a more brilliant success than if achieved by help of a victory. 'Battles are the last resort of a good general,' said one of the greatest. We are a little slow to believe it; but General Rosecrans is so thorough a teacher that the dullest of us shall yet prove apt scholars under his instruction. The popular imagination delights to conceive him in the storm of bullets, amid which his courage and capacity turned defeat to victory at Murfreesborough. Magnificently done it was; but Chattanooga is a still higher talent. Needless to remind ourselves that it was a famous rebel stronghold. Its impregnability has been vaunted in every rebel journal for a twelvemonth past. Nature had done her utmost to secure it from assault, and engineering science had trebled its natural strength.

"General Rosecrans might have buried half his army on its craggy slopes before he had fought his way into its recesses; but he turns its terrors into triumph by skilful strategy, and a simple flank movement discloses the weakness of this formidable fastness. It is simple, however, only in the same sense in which nearly all grand manœuvres are simple. They are the exact application of simple general principles in difficult circumstances, the

natural obstacles being in this case the greatest to overcome. Rivers, mountains, impracticable roads, a country barren of supplies,—these are what test a commander's capacity, and what General Rosecrans has just proved himself master of."

Even by the officers and privates of our army the strategy of their commander was very imperfectly understood at the outset, and it was by them grossly, though innocently, misrepresented. But by the time the result was attained, the whole army fully appreciated it, and they now consider this achievement as the grandest and most important of all. It is said that while riding along the lines after the final occupancy of the town, General Rosecrans thus addressed his troops in return for their cheers:—"Fellow-soldiers:—We struck for Chattanooga,—we fought for Chattanooga,—and here we are!"

An appreciative officer of our army (unknown to the author) writes as follows to friends in Wisconsin:—

"IN THE TRENCHES AT CHATTANOOGA, }
September 25, 1863.

"MY DEAR UNCLE:—

* * * * *

"The campaign I regard as one of the most brilliant and successful of the war. We have occupied the most important stronghold in the hands of the enemy against a vastly superior force. When Bragg evacuated this place, he expected, with the aid of large reinforcements, to take advantage of the weakness of our line, McCook's corps (right wing) being nearly forty miles distant from Chattanooga, where our left rested. This extension of our right was necessary in order to execute the flanking movement. Nothing seemed easier than for Bragg to cut us in two, and annihilate our comparatively small army by whipping us in detail. It was a skilfully laid and evidently long-matured plan of Bragg, and was foiled only by the consummate strategy of Rosecrans and the determined pluck of his troops.

"The right wing marched all night, fought and marched all day, thereby shifting itself to the centre before the enemy had time to strike; the left wing, aided by Granger's Reserve Corps, at the same time successfully prevented the efforts of the enemy to turn our left flank and get between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. For three days we contended against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy in this disadvantageous position, when Rosecrans finally succeeded in concentrating his army, saving his trains, and in occupying Chattanooga—the coveted position—in such force as to insure its permanent possession.

"The object of the campaign has been fully accomplished, and we have had to contend with much greater difficulties than ever we anticipated. The

enemy has been baffled and outwitted; he has gained no compensating advantage for the loss of Chattanooga in any way; and I believe that his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners is even heavier than ours. We in the army can appreciate better than you at home the genius of our commander in extricating us from our perilous position."

That officer could not have stated the case more clearly had he had his general's maps and notes in hand.

General Rosecrans's official report admits a loss (displacement) of sixteen thousand men, and General Bragg officially confesses to a loss of seventeen thousand. The Union commander announces in the same report that the enemy took four thousand nine hundred of our men prisoners, including the wounded on the battle-field; while we took two thousand rebel prisoners, none of them wounded.

As regards the extent of the rebel forces at the battles of Chickamauga, General Rosecrans assumes that they had at least seventy thousand men, upon this basis. We took prisoners from one hundred and fifty-three rebel consolidated regiments. They will average four hundred men to each regiment,—sixty-two thousand. Add to this at least eight thousand men for artillery. The rebel prisoners generally concurred in that estimate.

The Marietta (formerly Chattanooga) "Rebel," soon after the battle, stated that Bragg was "surrounded by a galaxy of higher military talent and backed by a larger army than he ever before commanded during his whole military career."

When the rebel newspapers gave the names of their generals who were killed, it was easy to see to what extent reinforcements had been sent to Bragg. Hood's, McLaws's, and Gregg's divisions—the two former of Longstreet's and the latter of Ewell's corps—are represented in their list of officers killed and wounded. The two divisions out of three of Longstreet's corps show forty-two regiments and about fifteen thousand men. Gregg's division, which is the third of Ewell's corps, numbers about ten thousand men. Thus Lee sent to Bragg from twenty-five thousand to thirty-one thousand men. When we add to this Bragg's original army, swelled by conscripts to at least thirty-five thousand men, ten thousand men under Buckner, together with

material reinforcements from Johnston and Pemberton's old armies, the latter having been declared released from their paroles given at Vicksburg, the magnitude of Bragg's army is well established. B. F. Taylor, Esq., who is now with the Army of the Cumberland as the war-correspondent of the Chicago "Journal," writes to that paper under recent date (October) as follows:—

"The business before us is formidable,—how formidable I fear the country does not quite appreciate. No such enemy ever sat down before a Federal hold, no such host ever before looked us face to face. No such stake has been ever before to be played for. One hundred thousand seasoned men will not exhaust the rebel roll. We here shall see the most terrible battle ever fought on this continent."

The value of the results of the campaign for Chattanooga is now universally recognized. The following, from the Knoxville "Register," at present published at Atlanta, Georgia, shows how important the rebels feel it to be to recapture East Tennessee:—

"If any one doubts the necessity which would impel President Davis to sacrifice Richmond, Charleston, and Mobile, all to reacquire East Tennessee, he need only ask the Commissary-General by what agencies and from what source the armies of the South have been sustained during the first year of the war. East Tennessee furnished the Confederate States with twenty-five millions of pounds of bacon. Last year the State of Tennessee fed the army."

And says the Richmond "Examiner" of October 31:—

"For a long time the importance of East Tennessee to the Confederacy seemed to be unappreciated. Not until that country fell into the possession of the enemy was its incalculable value realized. Except what was furtively obtained from Kentucky, the whole army supply of pork came from East Tennessee and the contiguous counties of the adjoining States. The product of corn in that region was very heavy, and no portion of the Confederacy, equal in extent, afforded as large a supply of forage and winter pasturage. The occupation of East Tennessee by our own armies was not only important in itself, but it was important also in respect to the contiguous country which it protected. A great line of railway was secured, continental in its dimensions and in its value. The saline and lead mines of Virginia, which produce all the salt and lead used in the Confederacy, were protected so long as East Tennessee was ours.

"But the evacuation of that region, and its surrender without a single battle to the enemy, has lost us all these advantages. The railway is broken

up, and there can be no communication between General Jones at Bristol and General Bragg at Chickamauga, who are less than one hundred and fifty miles apart, except by a circuit of twelve hundred miles through Petersburg, the Carolinas, and Augusta. The hogs of East Tennessee, affording twenty-five millions of pounds of pork, are now being slaughtered for the Yankee armies. The vast corn-crops and forage-supplies of that department, sufficient to winter all the live stock of the Confederate armies, are being fed to the fifty thousand horses and mules belonging to the forces of Grant. The salt and lead works of the Confederacy, and the numberless caves of Southwestern Virginia, from which immense supplies of saltpetre are obtained for the Ordnance Department, are now imminently threatened by the close presence of hostile armies, requiring the presence of heavy forces of our own for their protection."

After gaining Chattanooga, General Rosecrans vigorously pushed forward his earth-works in the rear. As at Corinth, at Nashville, and at Murfreesborough, he at once prepared *to stay*, and to make the place an extensive military depot. During four weeks he labored incessantly and effectively.

Notwithstanding the false impressions already mentioned, as to our "defeat," "disaster," and to our being "out-generalled," &c., the Union patriots of our land honored our army and its commander as greatly as ever, for the last display of their labor, their fortitude, and their bravery. It was not, therefore, on account of any public dissatisfaction that General Rosecrans was relieved from his command. The order came to him, unannounced, at four o'clock P.M. on the 19th day of October. At nine o'clock that evening he turned over his army to his old and tried friend and confidant, General Thomas. Desiring to have no commotion in the army, he prepared the following order to be issued after his departure, and at eight o'clock the next morning, October 20, just one year to a day from the time of his leaving his army at Corinth, Mississippi, to take this command, he bade farewell to the Army of the Cumberland:—

"GENERAL ORDERS, No. 242.

"HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, }
"CHATTANOOGA, TENN., October 19, 1863. }

"The general commanding announces to the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he leaves them, under orders from the President.

“Major-General George H. Thomas, in compliance with orders, will assume the command of this army and department.

“The chiefs of all the staff departments will report to him.

“In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms,—officers and soldiers,—he congratulates you that your new commander comes not to you, as he did, a stranger. General Thomas has been identified with this army from its first organization. He has led you often in battle. To his known prudence, dauntless courage, and true patriotism, you may look with confidence that under God he will lead you to victory.

“The general commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves and your country in the future as you have been in the past.

“To the division and brigade commanders he tenders his cordial thanks for their valuable and hearty co-operation in all that he has undertaken.

“To the chiefs of the staff departments and their subordinates whom he leaves behind he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring devotion to duty.

“Companions in arms,—officers and soldiers,—farewell; and may God bless you!

“W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*”

The causes of this action on the part of the Government have not been made public; but it is the duty of all patriots to presume that they are ample. Injurious and defamatory reports against General Rosecrans have arisen in this connection to die almost as soon as born. The author passes them by unnoticed farther than to leave them to be refuted by the enemy.

From the Richmond “Examiner,” October 26.

“Meantime, Lincoln is helping us. He has removed from command the most dangerous man in his army. A variety of mean and damaging pretexts for Rosecrans’s removal have been published by the Yankee press. But the true reason is the fact that he failed at Chickamauga.

* * * * *

“Rosecrans thus retired is unquestionably the greatest captain the Yankee nation has yet produced. His performances in the field are too fresh in the memory of every reader to necessitate recapitulation. We may, however, mention, in proof of his intellectual ability, that he graduated fifth at West Point in a class of fifty-six, in which General G. W. Smith graduated eighth and Longstreet fifty-fourth.”

The gigantic efforts now being made by the rebels to recover Chattanooga and its concomitant, East Tennessee, and the determination of the Federal Government to retain it, best attest the value of General Rosecrans’s last campaign. As we have remarked of his strategic and bloodless victory at Tullahoma, so

we may claim of Chattanooga, that, had he attacked and stormed it in front at a cost of five thousand of his soldiers, the world would hail it as a glorious and substantial victory. The result of the campaign is the same,—Chickamauga was the inevitable price of Chattanooga.

Thus we close our history of the Army of the Cumberland. To its future, under its wise and beloved leader, General Thomas, are committed, to a great extent, the hopes of the patriots of our land. May those hopes be gloriously and speedily fulfilled!

The theatre of war is now apparently changed; and upon the Georgia frontier are to be witnessed the culminating scenes of the rebellion. The Union armies are there assembling under the direction of Major-General Grant, the successful hero of Fort Donelson and Vicksburg. The next campaign of this grand army of the Union, thus commanded, will constitute an epoch in the history of our nation and of the world.

GEN. ROSECRANS
REPORT
OF THE
CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.

General Rosecrans's Report of the Chickamauga Campaign.

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, October 12, 1863.

REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND—THE OCCUPATION OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE, AND PASSAGE OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS.

The rebel army, after its expulsion from Middle Tennessee, crossed the Cumberland Mountains, by way of the Tantallon and University Roads, then moved down Battle Creek and crossed the Tennessee River, on bridges, it is said, near the mouth of Battle Creek, and at Kelly's Ferry, and on the railroad bridge, at Bridgeport. They destroyed a part of the latter, after having passed over it, and retired to Chattanooga and Tyner Station, leaving guards along the river. On their arrival at Chattanooga, they commenced immediately to throw up some defensive field-works at that place, and also at each of the crossings of the Tennessee, as far up as Blythe's Ferry.

Our troops, having pursued the rebels as far as supplies and the state of the roads rendered it practicable, took position from McMinnville to Winchester, with advances at Pelham and Stevenson. The latter soon after moved to Bridgeport, in time to save from total destruction a saw-mill there, but not in time to prevent the destruction of the railroad bridge.

After the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Middle Tennessee, the next objective point of this army was Chattanooga. It commands the southern entrance into East Tennessee, the most valuable, if not the chief, sources of supplies of coal for the manufactories and machine-shops of the Southern States, and is one of the great gateways through the mountains to the campaign counties of Georgia and Alabama.

For the better understanding of the campaign, I submit a brief outline of the topography of the country from the barrens of the northwestern base of the Cumberland Range, to Chattanooga and its vicinity.

The Cumberland Range is a lofty mass of rocks separating the waters which flow into the Cumberland from those which flow into the Tennessee, and extending from beyond the Kentucky line in a southwesterly direction nearly to Athens, Alabama. Its northwestern slopes are steep and rocky and scalloped in coves, in which are the heads of numerous streams that water Middle Tennessee. Its top is undulating or rough, covered with timber, soil comparatively barren, and in dry seasons scantily supplied with water. Its southeastern slope above Chattanooga for many miles is precipitous, rough, and difficult all the way up to Kingston. The valley between the foot of this slope and the river seldom exceeds four or five miles in width, and, with the exception of a narrow border along the banks, is undulating or hilly.

The Sequatchie Valley is along the river of that name, and is a cañon or deep cut splitting the Cumberland Range, parallel to its length. It is only three or four miles in breadth, and fifty miles in length. The sides of this valley are even more precipitous than the great eastern-and-western slopes of the Cumberland, which have just been described. To reach Chattanooga from McMinnville, or north of the Tennessee, it is necessary to turn the head of this Valley of the Tennessee, or to cross it by Dunlap or Thurman.

That part of the Cumberland Range between Sequatchie and the Tennessee, called Walden's Ridge, abuts on the Tennessee in high rocky bluffs, having no practicable space sufficient for a good wagon-road along the river. The Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad crosses that branch of the Cumberland Range west of the Sequatchie, through a low gap, by a tunnel east of Cowan, down the gorge of Big Crow Creek to Stevenson, at the foot of the mountain, on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, three miles from the Tennessee and ten miles from Bridgeport.

Between Stevenson and Chattanooga, on the south of the Tennessee, are two ranges of mountains, the Tennessee River separating them from the Cumberland, its channel a great chasm cut through the mountain-masses, which, in those places, abut directly on the river. These two ranges are separated by a narrow valley, through which runs Lookout Creek.

The Sand Mountains are next to the Tennessee, and their southern extremity is called Raccoon Mountain. Its sides are precipitous, and its top barren oak ridges, nearly destitute of water. There are but few, and these very difficult, wagon-roads by which to ascend and descend the slopes of this mountain.

East of Lookout Valley is Lookout Mountain, a vast palisade of rocks, rising twenty-four hundred feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt rocky cliffs, from a steep, wooded base. Its eastern sides are no less precipitous. Its top varies from one to six or seven miles in breadth, is heavily timbered, sparsely settled, and poorly watered. It terminates abruptly upon the Tennessee, two miles below Chattanooga, and the only practicable roads across it are one over the nose of the mountain at this point, one at Johnson's Creek, twenty-six miles distant, and one at Winston's Gap, forty-two miles distant from Chattanooga.

Between the eastern base of this range and the line of the Chattanooga & Atlanta or Georgia State Railroad, are a series of narrow valleys, separated by smaller ranges of hills or low mountains, over which there are quite a number of practicable wagon-roads running eastward towards the railroad. The first of these ranges is Mission Ridge, separating the waters of Chickamauga from Chattanooga Creek. A higher range, with fewer gaps, on the southeast side of the Chickamauga, is Pigeon Mountain, branching from Lookout, near Dougherty's Gap, some forty miles south from Chattanooga. It extends in a northerly direction, bearing eastward, until it is lost in the general level of the country, near the line of the Chattanooga & Lafayette Road.

East of these two ranges and of the Chickamauga, starting from Ottawah and passing by Ringgold to the west of Dalton, is Taylor's Ridge, a rough, rocky range, traversable by wagon-roads only through gaps, generally several miles apart.

Mission Ridge passes about three miles east of Chattanooga, ending near the Tennessee, at the mouth of the Chickamauga. Taylor's Ridge separates the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad from the Chattanooga & Atlanta Railroad.

The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylor's Ridge and west of the rough mountain-region in which are the sources of the Coosa River. This valley, only about nine or ten miles wide, is the natural southern gateway into East Tennessee, while the other valleys just mentioned terminate northwardly on the Tennessee to the west of it, and extend in a southwardly direction towards the line of the Coosa, the general direction of which, from the crossing of the Atlanta road to Rome and thence to Gadsden, is southwest.

From the position of our army at McMinnville, Tullahoma, Decherd, and Winchester, to reach Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee above it, it was necessary either to pass north of the Sequatchie Valley by Pikeville or Kingston, or to cross the main Cumberland and the Sequatchie Valley by Dunlap or Thurman and Walden's Ridge, by the routes passing through these places, a distance of sixty-five or seventy miles, over a country destitute of forage and poorly supplied with water, by narrow and difficult wagon-roads.

The main Cumberland range could also have been passed on an inferior road by Pelham and Tracy City, to Thurman. The most southerly route on which to move troops and transportation to the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, was by Cowan University, Battle Creek, and Jasper, or by Tantallon, Anderson,

Stevenson, or Bridgeport and the mouth of Battle Creek, to same point, and thence by Thurman or Dunlap and Poe's Tavern, across Walden's Ridge. The University road, though difficult, was the best of these two; that by Cowan, Tantallon, and Stevenson being very rough between Cowan and Anderson, and much longer.

There were, also, three roads across to the Tennessee River below Stevenson, —the best, but much the longest, by Fayetteville and Athens, a distance of seventy miles; the next, a very rough wagon-road from Winchester, by Salem, to Larkinsville; and an exceedingly rough road by way of Mount Top, one branch leading thence to Bellefont, and the other to Stevenson.

On these latter routes little or no forage was to be found, except at the extremities of the lines, and they were also scarce of water. The one by Athens has both forage and water in abundance.

It is evident, from this description of the topography, that to reach Chattanooga or penetrate the country south of it, on the railroad, by crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga, was a difficult task. It was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains with subsistence, ammunition, at least a limited supply of forage, and a bridge-train, to cross Sand or Raccoon Mountains into Lookout Valley, then Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges of Mission Ridge, if we went directly to Chattanooga, or Mission Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if we struck the railroad at Dalton or south of it. The valley of the Tennessee River, though several miles in breadth between the bases of the mountains below Bridgeport, is not a broad alluvial farming-country, but full of barren oak ridges, sparsely settled, and but a small part of it under cultivation.

The first step was to repair the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, to bring forward to Tullahoma, McMinnville, Decherd, and Winchester needful forage and subsistence, which it was impossible to transport from Murfreesborough to those points over the horrible roads which we encountered on our advance to Tullahoma. The next was to extend the repairs of the main stem to Stevenson and Bridgeport, and the Tracy City Branch, so that we could place supplies in the depots at those points, from which to draw after we had crossed the mountains.

Through Colonel Innis and his regiment of Michigan Engineers, the main road was opened to the Elk River bridge by the 13th of July, and Elk River bridge and the main stem to Bridgeport by the 25th, and the branch to Tracy City by the 13th of August.

As soon as the main stem was finished to Stevenson, Sheridan's division was advanced, two brigades, to Bridgeport, and one to Stevenson, and quartermaster and commissary stores pushed forward to the latter place with all practicable speed. These supplies began to be accumulated at this point in sufficient quantities by the 8th of August, and corps commanders were that day directed to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for a general movement.

The Tracy City Branch, built for bringing the coal down the mountains, has such high grades and sharp curves as to require a peculiar engine. The only one we had answering the purpose, having been broken on its way from Nashville, was not repaired until about the 12th of August. It was deemed best, therefore, to delay the movement of the troops until that road was completely available for transporting stores to Tracy City.

The movement over the Cumberland Mountains began on the morning of the 16th of August, as follows:—

General Crittenden's corps, in three columns: General Wood, from Hillsborough, by Pelham, to Thurman, in Squatchie Valley.

General Palmer, from Manchester, by the most practicable route, to Dunlap.

General Van Cleve, with two brigades from McMinnville, the third being left in garrison there, by the most practicable route, to Pikeville, the head of Squatchie Valley.

Colonel Minty's cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, to drive back Detrel's cavalry towards Kingston, where the enemy's mounted troops under Forrest

were concentrated, and then, covering the left flank of Van Cleve's column, to proceed to Pikeville.

The 14th Army Corps, Major-General George H. Thomas commanding, moved as follows:—

General Reynolds, from University, by way of Battle Creek, to take post concealed near its mouth.

General Brannan to follow him.

General Negley to go by Tantallon, and halt on Crow Creek, between Anderson and Stevenson.

General Baird to follow him and camp near Anderson.

The 20th Corps, Major-General A. McD. McCook commanding, moved as follows:—

General Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Ford to Bellefont.

General Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson.

The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens, to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up.

On his arrival in the Sequatchie Valley, General Crittenden was to send a brigade of infantry to reconnoitre the Tennessee, near Harrison's Landing, and take post at Poe's Cross-Roads; Minty was to reconnoitre from Washington down and take post at Smith's Cross-Roads; and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry was to reconnoitre from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga, and be supported by a brigade of infantry which General Crittenden was to send from Thurman to the foot of the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge, in front of Chattanooga.

These movements were completed by the evening of the 20th of August. Hazen's brigade made the reconnoissance on Harrison's Landing, and reported the enemy throwing up works there, and took post at Poe's Cross-Roads on the 21st. Wagner, with his brigade, supported Wilder in his reconnoissance on Chattanooga, which they surprised and shelled from across the river, creating no little agitation. Thus the army passed the first great barrier between it and the objective point, and arrived opposite the enemy on the banks of the Tennessee.

The crossing of the river required that the best points should be chosen, and means provided for the crossing. The river was reconnoitred; the pontoons and trains were ordered forward as rapidly as possible, hidden from view in the rear of Stevenson, and prepared for use. By the time they were ready, the places of crossing had been selected, and dispositions made to begin the operation. It was very desirable to conceal to the last moment the points of crossing; but, as the mountains on the south side of the Tennessee rise in precipitous, rocky bluffs, to the height of eight hundred or a thousand feet, completely overlooking the whole valley and its coves, this was next to impossible.

Not having pontoons for two bridges across the river, General Sheridan began trestle-work for parts of one at Bridgeport, while General Reynolds's division seized Shellmound, captured some boats, and from these, and material picked up, prepared the means of crossing at that point, and General Brannan prepared rafts for crossing his troops at the mouth of Battle Creek.

The laying of the pontoon-bridge at Caperton's Ferry was very handsomely done by the troops of General Davis, under the direction of General McCook, who crossed his advance in pontoons at daylight, driving the enemy's cavalry from the opposite side. The bridge at Bridgeport was finished on the 29th of August; but an accident occurred which delayed its final completion until September 2.

The movement across the river was commenced August 29, and completed on the 4th of September, leaving the regular brigade in charge of the railroad and depot at Stevenson until relieved by Major-General Granger, who was directed, as soon as practicable, to relieve it and take charge of the rear.

General Thomas's corps was to cross as follows: one division at Caperton's, one at Bridgeport, Reynolds's at Shellmound, in boats, and one division at Battle Creek, on rafts. All were to use the bridge at Bridgeport for such portions of their trains as they might find necessary, and to concentrate near Trenton, and send an advance to Frick's, Cooper's, and Stevens's Gaps on the

Lookout Mountain—the only practicable routes leading down the mountains into the valley called McLemore's Cove, which lies at its base and stretches northeastwardly towards Chattanooga. General McCook's corps was to cross, —two divisions at Caperton's Ferry,—move to the valley head and seize Winston's Gap, while Sheridan was to cross at Bridgeport as soon as the bridge was laid, and join the rest of his corps near Winston's, by way of Trenton.

General Crittenden was ordered down the Sequatchie, leaving two advance brigades, under Hazen and Wagner, with Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry, to watch and annoy the enemy. He was to cross the river, following Thomas's corps at the crossing, and to take post on the Murphy's Hollow Road, pushing an advance brigade to reconnoitre the enemy at the foot of Lookout, and take post at Wauhatchie, communicating from its main body with Thomas on the right, up the Trenton Valley and threatening Chattanooga by passing over the point of Lookout.

The cavalry, crossing at Caperton's and a ford near Island Creek, were to unite in Lookout Valley, take post at Rawlingsville and reconnoitre boldly towards Rome and Alpine.

These movements were completed by McCook's and Crittenden's corps on the 6th, and by Thomas's corps on the 8th of September. The cavalry, for some reason, was not pushed with the vigor nor to the extent which orders and the necessities of the campaign required. Its continual movement since that period, and the absence of Major-General Stanley, Chief of Cavalry, have prevented the report which may throw some light on the subject.

The first barriers south of the Tennessee being crossed, the enemy was found firmly holding the point of Lookout Mountain with infantry and artillery, while our forces on the north side of the river reported the movements of the rebel forces from East Tennessee and their concentration at Chattanooga. To dislodge him from that place, it was necessary to carry Lookout Mountain, or so to move as to compel him to quit his position by endangering his line of communication. The latter plan was chosen.

The cavalry were ordered to advance on our extreme right to Summerville, in Broomtown Valley, and General McCook was ordered to support the movement by a division of infantry thrown forward to the vicinity of Alpine. It was executed on the 8th and 9th of September.

General Thomas was ordered to cross his corps by Frick's, Cooper's, and Stevens's Gaps, and occupy the head of McLemore's Cove. General Crittenden was ordered to reconnoitre the front of Lookout Mountain, sending a brigade up an almost impracticable path, called Nickajack Trace, to Summertown, a hamlet on the summit of the mountain, overlooking Chattanooga, and holding the main body of his corps either to support these reconnoissances, to prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose of Lookout, or to enter Chattanooga in case the enemy should evacuate it or make but a feeble resistance. Simultaneously with this movement, the cavalry were ordered to push by way of Alpine and Broomtown Valley and strike the enemy's railroad-communication between Resaca Bridge and Dalton.

This movement was promptly begun on the 8th and 9th of September. The reconnoissance of General Crittenden on the 9th developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga the day and night previous; and his advance took peaceable possession at one o'clock p.m. His whole corps, with its trains, passed around the point of Lookout Mountain on the 10th, and camped for the night at Rossville, five miles south of Chattanooga.

During these operations, General Thomas pushed his corps over the mountains at the designated points. Each division consumed two days in the passage. The weight of evidence gathered from all sources, was, that Bragg was moving on Rome, and that his movements began on the 6th of September. General Crittenden was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga with one brigade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to follow the enemy's retreat vigorously, anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold and Dalton. Additional information obtained during the afternoon and evening of the 10th of September rendered it certain that his main body retired by the Lafayette road, but uncertain whether he had gone

far. General Crittenden was ordered, at one o'clock A.M. on the 11th, to proceed to the front, and report, directing his command to advance only as far as Ringgold and order a reconnoissance to Gordon's Mills. His report, and further evidence, satisfied me that the main body of the rebel army were in the vicinity of Lafayette. General Crittenden was therefore ordered to move his corps, with all possible despatch, from Ringgold to Gordon's Mills, and communicate with General Thomas, who had by that time reached the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain. General Crittenden occupied Ringgold on the 11th, pushing Wilder's mounted infantry as far as Tunnel Hill, skirmishing heavily with the enemy's cavalry. Hazen joined him near Ringgold on the 11th, and the whole corps moved rapidly and successfully across to Gordon's Mills on the 12th. Wilder, following, and covering the movement, had a severe fight with the enemy at Sill's Tan-Yard.

During the same day the 4th U.S. Cavalry were ordered to move past the Dry Valley road to discover if the enemy was in proximity to that road on Crittenden's right, and open communication with Thomas's command, which, passing over the mountain, was debouching from Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps, and moving on Lafayette through Dry Gap of the Pigeon Mountain. On the 10th, Negley's division advanced to within a mile of Dry Gap, which they heavily obstructed, and Baird's division came up to his support on the morning of the 11th. Negley became satisfied that the enemy was advancing upon him in heavy force, and, perceiving that if he accepted battle in that position he would probably be cut off, he fell back, after a sharp skirmish in which General Baird's division participated, skilfully covering and securing their trains, to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap.

On the 12th, Reynolds and Brannan, under orders to move, promptly closed up to the support of these two advance divisions. During the same day, General McCook had reached the vicinity of Alpine, and, with infantry and cavalry, had reconnoitred the Broomtown Valley to Summerville, and ascertained that the enemy had not retreated on Rome, but was concentrating at Lafayette. There it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, upon the Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of Lafayette, while two corps of this army were at Gordon's Mills, Bailey's Cross-Roads at the foot of Stevens's Gap, and at Alpine, a distance of fifty miles from flank to flank by the nearest practicable roads, and fifty-seven miles by the route subsequently taken by the 20th Corps. It had already been ascertained that the main body of Johnston's army had joined Bragg, and an accumulation of evidence showed that the troops from Virginia had reached Atlanta on the 1st of the month, and that reinforcements were expected soon to arrive from that quarter. It was, therefore, a matter of life and death to effect a concentration of the army.

General McCook had already been directed to support General Thomas, and was now ordered to send two brigades to hold Dougherty's Gap, and to join General Thomas, with the remainder of his command, with the utmost celerity, directing his march over the road on the top of the mountain. He had already, with great prudence, moved his trains back to the rear of Little River, on the mountain, but, unfortunately, being ignorant of the mountain-road, moved down the mountain at Winston's Gap, down Lookout Valley and Cooper's Gap, up the mountain and down again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th, and having posted Davis at Brooks's, in front of Dug Gap, Johnson at Pound Spring, in front of Catlett's Gap, and Sheridan at the foot of Stevens's Gap.

As soon as General McCook's corps arrived, General Thomas moved down the Chickamauga, towards Gordon's Mills. Meanwhile, to bring General Crittenden within reach of General Thomas and beyond the danger of separation, he was withdrawn from Gordon's Mills on the 14th, and ordered to take post on the southern spur of Mission Ridge, his right communicating with General Thomas, where he remained until General McCook had effected a junction with General Thomas.

Minty, with his cavalry, reconnoitred the enemy on the 15th, and repulsed him in force at Dalton, Ringgold, Letts, and Rockspring Church. The head of General McCook's column near the same place, General Crittenden was ordered

to return to hold possession at Gordon's Mills, his line resting along the Chickamauga, by way of Crawfish Springs.

Thus, on the evening of the 17th, the troops were substantially within supporting distance. Orders were given at once to move the whole line, in the order of battle, down the Chickamauga, with a view of covering the Lafayette road towards Chattanooga, and facing the most practicable route to the enemy's front. The position of our troops and the narrowness of the roads retarded our movements. During the day, while they were in progress, our cavalry, under Colonel Minty, was attacked on the left in the road. It became apparent that the enemy was massing heavily on our left, crossing Reed's and Alexander's bridges in force, while he had threatened Gordon's Mills. Orders were, therefore, promptly given to General Thomas to relieve General Crittenden's corps, posting one division near Crawfish Springs, and to move with the remainder of his corps by the Widow Glenn's house to Rossville and the Lafayette road, his left extending obliquely across it near Kelley's house. General Crittenden was ordered to proceed with Van Cleve and Palmer's divisions to draw the enemy from the Rossville road and form on the left of General Wood, then at Gordon's Mills.

General McCook's corps was to close up to General Thomas, keep the position at Crawfish Springs, and protect General Crittenden's right, while holding his corps mainly in reserve. The main cavalry force was ordered to close in on General McCook's right, watch the crossing of the Chickamauga, and act under his orders. The movement for the concentration of the corps more compactly towards Crawfish Springs was begun on the morning of the 18th under orders to conduct it very secretly, and was executed so slowly that McCook's corps only reached Pound Spring at dark, and bivouacked, resting on their arms during the night. Crittenden's corps reached its position on the Rossville road near midnight.

Evidence accumulated, during the day of the 18th, that the enemy was moving to our left. Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted brigade encountered the enemy's cavalry at Reed's and Alexander's bridges towards evening, and were driven in to the Rossville road. At the same time, the enemy had been demonstrating for three miles up the Chickamauga. Heavy clouds of dust had been observed three or four miles beyond the Chickamauga, sweeping to the northwest.

In view of all these facts, the necessity became apparent that General Thomas must use all possible despatch in moving his corps to the position assigned him. He was therefore directed to proceed with all despatch, and General McCook to close up to Crawfish Springs as soon as Thomas's column was out of the way. Thomas pushed forward uninterruptedly during the night, and by daylight the head of his column had reached Kelley's house, on the Lafayette road, where Baird's division was posted. Brannan followed, and was posted on Baird's left, crossing the road leading to Reed's and Alexander's bridges.

At this point, Colonel McCook, of General Grauger's corps, who had made a reconnoissance to the Chickamauga the evening before and had burned Reed's bridge, met General Thomas, and reported that an isolated brigade of the enemy was this side of the Chickamauga, and, the bridge being destroyed, a rapid movement in that direction might result in the capture of the force thus isolated. General Thomas ordered Brannan, with two brigades, to reconnoitre in that direction and attack any small force he should meet. The advance brigade, supported by the rest of the division, soon encountered a strong body of the enemy, attacked it vigorously, and drove it back more than half a mile, where a very strong column of the enemy was found, with the evident intention of turning our left and gaining possession of the Lafayette road between us and Chattanooga. This vigorous movement disconcerted the plan of the enemy to move on our left, and opened the battle of the 19th of September.

The leading brigade became engaged at about ten o'clock A.M. on the 19th, on our extreme left, extending to the right, where the enemy combined to move in heavy masses. Apprehending this movement, I had ordered General McCook to send Johnson's division to Thomas's assistance; and he arrived opportunely.

General Crittenden, with great good sense, had already despatched Palmer's

division, reporting the fact to me, and receiving my approval. The enemy returned our attack, and was driving back Baird's right in disorder, when Johnson struck the attacking column in flank, and drove it back more than half a mile, until his own right was overlapped and in imminent danger of being turned, when Palmer, coming in on Johnson's right, threw his division against the enemy and drove back his advancing columns. Palmer's right was soon overlapped, when Van Cleve's division came to his support, but was beaten back, when Reynolds's division came in, and was, in turn, overpowered. Davis's division came into the fight then most opportunely, and drove the enemy, who soon, however, developed superior force against his line, and pressed him so heavily that he was giving ground, when Wood's division came, and turned the tide of battle the other way.

About three p.m., General McCook was ordered to send Sheridan's division to the support of our line near Wood and Davis, directing Lytle's brigade to hold Gordon's Mills, our extreme right. Sheridan also arrived opportunely to save Wood from disaster, and the rebel tide was thoroughly stayed in that quarter.

Meanwhile, the roar of musketry on our centre grew louder, and the battle approached head-quarters at Widow Glenn's house, until musket-balls came near and shells burst about it. Our centre was being driven. Orders were sent to General Negley to move his division from Crawfish Springs and above, where he had been holding the line of the Chickamauga, to Widow Glenn's, to be held in reserve, to give support wherever it might be required. At half-past four p.m. he reported with his division; and, as the indications that our centre was being driven became clearer, he was despatched in that direction, and soon found the enemy had dislodged Van Cleve from the line, and was forming there even while Thomas was driving their right. Orders were promptly given Negley to attack him, which he soon did, driving him steadily until night closed the combat.

General Brannan, having repulsed the enemy on the extreme left, was sent by General Thomas to support the centre and at night assume the position on the right of Reynolds. Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry occupied during the day a position on the Lafayette road, one mile north of Gordon's Mills, where he had taken position on the afternoon previous,—when, contesting the ground step by step, he had been driven by the enemy's advance from Alexander's bridge. Minty's cavalry had been ordered from the same position about noon of the 19th, to report to General Granger at Rossville, which he did at daylight on the 20th, and was posted near Mission Mills to hold in check the enemy's cavalry on their right, from the direction of Ringgold and Graysville.

The reserve corps covered the approaches from the Chickamauga towards Rossville on our left. The roar of battle hushed in the darkness of night, and our troops, weary with a night of marching and a day of fighting, rested on their arms, having everywhere maintained their positions, developed the enemy, and gained thorough command of the Rossville and Dry Valley roads to Chattanooga,—the great object of the battle of the 19th of September. The battle had secured us these objects; our flank covered the Dry Valley and Rossville roads, while our cavalry covered the Mission Ridge and the valley of Chickamauga Creek, into which latter place our spare trains had been sent on Friday, the 18th.

We also had indubitable evidence of the presence of Longstreet's corps and Johnston's forces by the capture of prisoners from each; and the fact that at the close of the day we had present but two brigades which had not been in action, opposed to the superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were greatly outnumbered, and that the battle of the next day must be for the safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga.

During the evening of the 19th, the corps commanders were assembled at head-quarters at Widow Glenn's house. The reports of the position and condition of their commands were heard, and orders given for the disposition of the troops on the following day. Thomas's corps, with the troops which had reinforced him, was to maintain, substantially, its present line with Brannan in reserve. McCook, maintaining his picket-line until it was driven in, was to

close on Thomas, his right refused, and covering the position at Widow Glenn's house; and Crittenden to have two divisions in reserve near the junction of McCook's and Thomas's lines, to be able to support either. Plans having been explained and written, advice given to each and read in the presence of all, the weary corps commanders returned about midnight to their commands. No firing took place during the night, and the troops had assumed position when day dawned. The sky was red and sultry, and the atmosphere of the woods enveloped in fog and smoke. As soon as it was sufficiently light, I proceeded, accompanied by General Garfield and some aides, to inspect the lines.

I found General McCook's right too far upon the crest, and General Davis in reserve upon a hillside west of and parallel to the Dry Valley road. I mentioned these defects to the general, desiring Davis's division to be brought down at once, moved more to the left, and placed in close column, by division doubled on the centre, in a sheltered position.

I found General Crittenden's two divisions massed at the foot of the same hill, in the valley, and called his attention to it, desiring them to be moved farther to the left.

General Thomas's troops were in the position indicated, except Palmer's line, which was to be closed more compactly.

Satisfied that the enemy's first attempt would be on our left, orders were despatched to General Negley to join General Thomas, and to General McCook to relieve Negley. Returning to the right, I found Negley had not moved, nor were McCook's troops coming in to relieve him. Negley was preparing to withdraw his two brigades from the line. He was ordered to send his reserve brigade immediately, and follow it with the others only when relieved in line of battle. General Crittenden, whose troops were nearest, was ordered to fill General Negley's place at once, and General McCook was notified of this order, growing out of the necessity of promptly sending Negley to Thomas. Proceeding to the extreme right, I felt the disadvantages of its position, mentioned them to General McCook, and, when I left him, enjoined on him that it was an indispensable necessity that we should keep closed to the left, and that we must do so at all hazards. On my return to the position of General Negley, I found, to my astonishment, that General Crittenden had not relieved him, Wood's division having reached the position of Negley's reserve. Peremptory orders were given to repair this, and Wood's troops moved into position: but this delay subsequently proved of serious consequence. The battle began on the extreme left at half-past eight A.M., and it was half-past nine o'clock when Negley was relieved.

An aide arriving from General Thomas, requesting that Negley's remaining brigades be sent forward as speedily as possible to succor the left, General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve with all possible despatch to a position in the rear of Wood, who closed in on Brannan's right. General McCook was ordered to move Davis up to close in on Wood and fill an opening in the line.

On my return from an examination of the ground in the rear of our right and left centre, I found, to my surprise, that General Van Cleve was posted in line of battle on a high ridge, much too far to the rear to give immediate support to the main line of battle, and General Davis in line of battle in rear of the ridge occupied by Negley's reserve in the morning. General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve at once down the hill to a better position, and General Davis was also ordered to close up to the support of the line near Wood's right. The battle in the mean time roared with increasing fury and approached from the left to the centre. Two aids arrived successively within a few minutes from General Thomas, asking for reinforcements. The first was directed to say that General Negley had already gone, and should be nearly at hand at that time, and that Brannan's reserve brigade was available. The other was directed to say that General Van Cleve would at once be sent to his assistance, which was accordingly done.

A message from General Thomas soon followed, that he was heavily pressed, Captain Kellog, A.D.C., the bearer, informing me at the same time that General Brannan was out of line and General Reynolds's right was exposed. Orders

were despatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he should be supported even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook.

General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and General McCook was advised of the state of affairs, and ordered to close his whole command to the left with all despatch.

General Wood, overlooking the direction to "close up" on General Reynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing to the rear of General Brannan, who, it appears, was not out of line, but was in *échelon* and slightly in rear of Reynolds's right. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear as well as in front, threw his whole division into confusion. The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood before it had cleared the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, and two of his batteries then in movement to a new position were taken in flank and thrown back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then on the march to the left, throwing his division into confusion, from which it never recovered until it reached Rossville.

While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line, stretching beyond Sheridan's right, was advancing. Laibold's brigade shared in the rout of Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades, in movement towards the left, under orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the enemy's advancing column, but were thrown into disorder by the enemy's line advancing on their flank, and were likewise compelled to fall back, rallying in the Dry Valley road and repulsing the enemy, but were again compelled to yield to superior numbers, and retired westward of the Dry Valley, and, by a circuitous route, reached Rossville, from which they advanced, by the Lafayette road, to support our left.

Thus, Davis's two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division, were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades, and one of Van Cleve's, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole efforts to destroy them.

At the moment of the repulse of Davis's division, I was standing in rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the distance Davis's men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging towards us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops direction to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley road. I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, and Major Bond, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape and canister and musketry, for two or three hundred yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed troops far towards the left; and, hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga to give orders for the security of the pontoon-bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position.

General Garfield despatched me from Rossville that the left and centre still held its ground. General Granger had gone to its support. General Sheridan had rallied his division, and was advancing towards the same point, and General Davis was going up the Dry Valley road, to our right. General Garfield proceeded to the front, remained there until the close of the fight, and despatched me the triumphant defence our troops there made against the assaults of the enemy.

The fight on the left, after two p.m., was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least, have troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet-charges, often heard of, but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and regiments, in several of our divisions.

After the yielding and severance of the divisions on the right, the enemy made all efforts to break the solid portions of our line. Under the pressure of the rebel onset, the flanks of the line were gradually retired until they occupied strong advantageous ground.

From one to half-past three o'clock, the unequal contest was sustained throughout our line. Then the enemy, in overpowering numbers, flanked around our right, held by General Brannan, and occupied a low gap in the ridge of our defensive position, which commanded our rear. The moment was critical. Twenty minutes more, and our right would have been turned, our position taken in reverse, and, probably, the army routed.

Fortunately, Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to cover our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and general, hearing the roar of battle on our left, and being beyond the reach of orders from the general commanding, determined to move to its assistance. He advanced, and soon encountered the enemy's skirmishers, whom he disregarded, well knowing that at that stage of the conflict the battle was not there. Posting Colonel Dan. C. McCook's brigade to take care of any thing in the vicinity and beyond the left of our lines, he moved the remainder to the scene of action, reporting to General Thomas, who directed him to our suffering right.

Arrived in sight, General Granger discovered at once the peril and point of danger, the Gap; and quick as thought he directed his advance-brigade upon the enemy. General Steedman, taking a regimental color, led the column. Swift was the charge and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand of our brave men killed and wounded paid for its possession, but we held the Gap.

Two divisions of Longstreet's corps confronted the position. Determined to take it, they successively came to the assault. A battery of six guns, placed in the gorge, poured death and slaughter into them. They charged to within a few yards of our pieces; but our grape and canister, and the leaden hail of our musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys, from cartridges taken in many instances from their fallen companions, was too much even for Longstreet's men. About sunset they made their last charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, rushed on them with the bayonet, and they gave way to return no more.

The fury of the conflict was nearly as great on the fronts of Brannan and Wood, being less furious towards the left. But a column of the enemy had made its way to near our left, and to the right of Colonel McCook's position. Apprized of this, General Thomas directed Reynolds to move his division from its position, and, pointing out the rebels, told him to go in there.

To save time, the troops of Reynolds were formed by the rear rank, and, moving with the bayonet at a double-quick with a shout, walked over the rebels, capturing some five hundred. This closed the battle of the 20th. At nightfall the enemy had been repulsed along the whole line, and sank into quietude without attempting to renew the combat.

General Thomas, considering the excessive labors of the troops, the scarcity of ammunition, food, and water, and having orders from the general commanding to use his discretion, determined to retire on Rossville, where they arrived in good order and took post before morning, receiving supplies from Chattanooga, and offering the enemy battle during all the next day and repulsing his reconnoissance. On the night of the 21st, we withdrew from Rossville, took firm possession of the objective point of our campaign,—Chattanooga,—and prepared to hold it.

The operations of the cavalry during the battle of the 19th were very important. General Mitchell, with three brigades, covered our right flank along the line of the Chickamauga above Crawfish Springs, against the combined efforts of the great body of the rebel cavalry, whose attempts to cross the stream they several times repulsed.

Wilder fought, dismounted, near the centre, intervening, two or three times, with mountain-howitzers and Spencer rifles very opportunely.

On the 20th, Minty covered our left and rear at Mission Mills, and later in the day on the Ringgold road.

General Mitchell with his three brigades covered our extreme right, and with Wilder's, after its repulse, extended over Mission Ridge, held the whole country to the base of Lookout Mountain, and all our trains, artillery, caissons, and spare wagons, sent there for greater safety, retiring from the field. He was joined by Post's brigade of Davis's division, which had not closed on the army and was not in action.

On the 21st the cavalry still covered our right as securely as before, fighting and holding at bay very superior numbers. The number of cavalry combats during the whole campaign have been numerous, the successes as numerous; but the army could not have dispensed with those of the 19th, 20th, and 21st.

Our artillery fired fewer rounds than at Stone River, but with even greater effect. I cannot but congratulate the country on the rapid improvement evinced in this part of the service. Our loss of pieces is in part attributable to the rough wooded ground in which we fought, and to want of experience in posting artillery, and partly to the unequal nature of the contest, our infantry being heavily outnumbered.

For the details of these actions, the innumerable instances of distinguished bravery, skill, and gallantry displayed by officers of every rank, and, above all, for self-reliant, cool, and steady courage displayed by the soldiers of the army of all arms, in many instances even shining above that of their officers, I must refer to the accompanying reports of corps, division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders. The reports of the cavalry commands are not in, for the best of all reasons,—that they have been out nearly ever since, writing with their sabres on the heads and backs of the enemy.

The Signal Corps has been growing into usefulness and favor daily for the last four months, and now bids fair to become one of the most esteemed of the staff services. It rendered very important service from the time we reached the Valley of the Tennessee. For its operations I refer to the report of Captain Jesse Merrill, Chief Signal Officer.

Our Medical Corps proved very efficient during the whole campaign, and especially during and subsequent to the battle. A full share of praise is due to Dr. Glover Perin, the Medical Director of the department, ably assisted by Drs. Grose, Medical Director 14th, Perkins, 20th, and Phelps, 21st Army Corps. A very great need of praise is due Captain Horace Porter, of the Ordnance Department, for the wise system of arming each regiment with arms of the same calibre, and having the ammunition wagons properly marked, by which most of the difficulties in supplying ammunition, when troops had exhausted it in battle, were obviated. From his report it will be seen that we expended 2,650,000 rounds of musket-cartridges, and 7325 rounds of cannon-ammunition, being 12,675 rounds less of artillery, and 650,000 rounds more of musketry, than at Stone River.

We lost 36 pieces of artillery, 20 caissons, 5834 infantry accoutrements, 8450 stand of small arms.

From the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Wiles, Provost-Marshal General, it will be seen that we took 2003 prisoners. We have missing, of which some 600 have escaped and come in, and probably 700 or 800 are among the killed and wounded. Of our wounded, some 2500 fell into the hands of the enemy, swelling the balance of prisoners against us to about 5500.

It is proper to observe that the battle of Chickamauga was absolutely necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was fought in a country covered with woods and undergrowth and wholly unknown to us. Every division came into action opportunely and fought squarely on the 19th. We were largely outnumbered, yet foiled the enemy's flank movement on our left, and secured our own position on the road to Chattanooga. The battle of the 20th was fought with all the troops we had, and, but for the extension and delay in closing our right, we should probably have driven the enemy, whom we really beat on the field. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's loss largely exceeds ours.

It is my duty to notice the services of those faithful officers who have none but myself to notice them.

To Major-General Thomas, the true soldier, the prudent and undaunted commander, the modest and incorruptible patriot, the thanks and the gratitude of the country are due for his conduct at the battle of Chickamauga.

Major-General Granger, by his promptitude, arrived and carried his troops into action in time to save the day. He deserves the highest praise.

Major-General McCook, for the care of his command, prompt and willing execution of orders, to the best of his ability, deserves this testimonial of my approbation.

I bear testimony likewise to the high hearted, noble Major-General Crittenden. Prompt in the moving and reporting the position of his troops, always fearless on the field of battle, I return my thanks for the promptness and military good-sense with which he sent his division towards the noise of battle on the 19th.

To Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, Chief of Staff, I am especially indebted for the clear and ready manner in which he seized the points of action and movement, and expressed in orders the ideas of the general commanding.

Colonel J. C. McKibben, A.D.C., always efficient, gallant, and untiring, and fearless in battle.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Ducat, brave, prompt, and energetic in action.

Major Frank S. Bond, senior A.D.C., Captain J. P. Drouillard, A.D.C., and Captain R. S. Thoms, A.D.C., deserve my honorable mention for the faithful and efficient discharge of their appropriate duties always, and especially during the battle.

Colonel Jas. Barnett, Chief of Artillery; Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons, Chief Commissary; Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Hodges, Chief Quartermaster; Dr. G. Perin, Medical Director; Captain Horace Porter, Chief of Ordnance; Captain Wm. E. Merrill, Chief Topographical Engineer; Brigadier-General J. St. Clair Morton, were all in the battle, and discharged their duties with ability and to my entire satisfaction.

Colonel Wm. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and his command, have rendered very valuable services in keeping open communications and watching the movements of the enemy, which deserve my warmest thanks.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Ward, with the 10th Ohio Provost and Headquarters Guard, rendered efficient and valuable services, especially on the 20th, in covering the movement of retiring trains on the Dry Valley road, and stopping the stragglers from the fight. Captain Garner and the escort deserve mention for untiring energy in carrying orders.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Goddard, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. M. Wiles, Provost-Marshal General; Major Wm. McMichael, Assistant Adjutant-General; Surgeon H. H. Seyes, Medical Inspector; Captain D. G. Swain, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of the Secret Service; Captain William Farrar, Aide-de-Camp; Captain J. H. Young, General Commissary of Musters; Captain A. S. Burt, Acting Assistant Inspector-General; Captain H. Brooke, Acting Judge-Advocate; Captain W. C. Morgendant, Acting Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant George Burroughs, Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant Wm. Porter, Acting Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant James Reynolds, Acting Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant M. J. Kelly, Chief of Couriers; and Assistant Surgeon D. Bache, were on the field of battle, and there and elsewhere discharged their duties with zeal and ability.

I must not omit Colonel J. P. Sanderson, of the regular infantry, who, having lately joined us, on those two days of battle acted as aide-de-camp, and carried orders to the hottest part of the field.

Of those division and brigade commanders whose gallantry, skill, and services are prominent, individual special mention accompanies this report. A list of the names of those, and others, of every grade, whose conduct, according to the reports of their respective commanders, deserves special mention, is also herewith sent.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. ROSECRANS.

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